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Abstract
This paper examines social agglomeration externalities. Using survey data from
the German Socio-Economic Panel, I examine the link between city size and diﬀer-
ent measures of consumption, social interaction and social capital. Further, using
responses to satisfaction questions, I analyse whether individuals are compensated
for diseconomies of agglomeration by positive agglomeration externalities in other
areas. This equilibrium hypothesis cannot be rejected.
JEL classiﬁcation: R22, R23
Keywords: agglomeration, externalities, social interaction.
1 Introduction
About 75% of the population in developed countries live in cities. Since housing prices,
commuting costs, congestion, pollution and crime all increase with city size, a good ques-
tion is, why? Given these obvious costs of agglomerations, the existence of cities must
be explained by countervailing agglomeration economies. At least since Alfred Marshall,
economists have emphasised the positive role of agglomeration for economic activity. Pro-
ductivity in big cities is thought to be higher because of larger input markets, knowledge
spillovers, and beneﬁts from labour pooling. A large branch of urban economics is con-
cerned with the theoretical modelling and empirical identiﬁcation of these agglomeration
∗Thanks to Peter Haan and Alois Stutzer for helpful comments and to Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell for
providing Stata code.
1externalities (see Duranton and Puga, 2004 for a survey of theoretical approaches and
Rosenthal and Strange, 2004 for a survey of empirical studies).
If productive externalities are prevalent, individuals in big cities should receive higher
nominal wages which compensate for the higher housing and commuting costs. However,
besides facilitating production, cities also serve as centers of consumption and social inter-
actions. This implies that individuals may accept lower real wages in large cities if they
are compensated by other agglomeration economies. And, indeed, Tabuchi and Yoshida
(2000) and Glaeser et al. (2001) ﬁnd that while nominal wages increase with city size, living
costs increase even faster so real wages decrease with city size. This implies that produc-
tive agglomeration externalities alone are not enough to compensate individuals for the
diseconomies of agglomeration. Rather, there must be other agglomeration eﬀects which
are not capitalised in wages.
The aim of this paper is to assess the importance of various kinds of non-productive
agglomeration externalities. I will use the term social agglomeration economies for those
agglomeration eﬀects which do not aﬀect individual productivity but still beneﬁt individ-
uals.
While urban economists have traditionally emphasised the role of cities in production,
more recent papers have focussed on agglomeration economies stemming from beneﬁts in
consumption or social interaction (Glaeser, 2000; Glaeser et al., 2001). Glaeser et al. (2001)
argue that cities are centres of consumption. They show that cities with amenities such as
good climate and many restaurants per capita have grown faster than cities without such
amenities. Consumption externalities also play a central role in the theoretical literature
of the new economic geography. Following Krugman’s (1991b) seminal contribution, this
literature studies agglomeration beneﬁts stemming from the interaction of consumers’ love
for variety, increasing returns on the ﬁrm level and transport costs. An empirical assessment
of consumers’ evaluation of the consumption beneﬁts provided by agglomeration would
therefore also be important for this large and growing branch of economics.
Glaeser (2000) argues that non-market interactions present the future of urban research.
Indeed, he argues that one cannot understand cities without understanding nonmarket in-
teractions. It is quite clear that many social interactions are facilitated by spatial proximity.
Glaeser (2000, 2004) examines diﬀerent indicators of social interaction and shows the im-
portance of city size as a determinant. I use many of the same indicators and will comment
on them further below. Whereas Glaeser (2000, 2004) mainly shows simple correlations
2and OLS estimates, I also present evidence from OLS and, in addition, ﬁxed eﬀects and
instrumental variable estimates.
The body of the paper studies how indicators of various kinds of social interaction are
inﬂuenced by city size. Among these indicators are various measures of consumption, such
as visits to restaurants, cinemas, and so on, measures of social interaction such as trust,
number of friends, partnership, and measures of ‘social capital’ such as membership in
organisations and political interests.
Finally, I also examine satisfaction with life in general and satisfaction with various
speciﬁc domains, in particular, housing, job and consumption. The idea is to test an
equilibrium hypothesis: if individuals are mobile, in equilibrium, residents of larger cities
should just be compensated for the diseconomies in certain domains, such as commut-
ing and housing markets, by agglomeration economies in other domains, such as labour
markets, consumption or social interaction.
The results indicate that city size is an important inﬂuence on many of these indica-
tors. Some measures of social interaction and social capital reveal positive agglomeration
economies while other reveal negative economies. Moreover, including ﬁxed eﬀects washes
out individual heterogeneity and at the same time reduces some of the eﬀects of city size.
The strongest evidence in favor of agglomeration economies is shown in consumption, while
the evidence for social interaction and social capital is somewhat mixed. Moreover, the
data on satisfaction indicate that individuals in bigger cities experience higher satisfaction
in consumption and lower satisfaction in housing, while they show no marked eﬀect on job
satisfaction. Overall life satifsfaction does not seem to depend on city size. Hence, the
hypothesis that, in equilibrium, agglomeration economies and diseconomies just balance
each other cannot be rejected.
The paper is organised as follows. The next section presents a brief overview of the
kinds of social agglomeration externalities considered in this paper. Section 3 describes
the data used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 shows the regression results from simple
OLS (or ordered logit) regressions. Section 5 addresses selection issues, and the last section
concludes the paper.
32 Social agglomeration externalities
In this section, I describe the types of externalities on which the empirical analysis will be
based. I will categorise externalities into three types described in the following subsections:
consumption, social interaction and ‘social capital’. In the last subsection, I brieﬂy discuss
agglomeration diseconomies in housing markets and how one can empirically assess whether
these are outweighed by agglomeration economies in labour markets or social economies.
2.1 Consumption
There are many goods for which membership must exceed a certain threshold for the good
to be proﬁtably supplied. For instance, in small towns, there typically won’t be cinemas,
theatres or concert halls, and there will be only a limited number of restaurants. Therefore,
consumers in bigger cities should beneﬁt from the usage of these ‘club goods’.
There is also an important agglomeration externality in consumption which is em-
phasised by the new economic geography. Models using the Dixit-Stiglitz assumption of
consumers’ love for variety show that ﬁrms locate in cities to be close to consumers and
economise on transport costs, and consumers locate in cities to beneﬁt from the lower
price index of consumption goods (Krugman, 1991a,b). Hence, individuals move to large
agglomerations and take advantage of lower goods prices.
2.2 Social interaction
Man is a social animal. It is relatively obvious that the beneﬁts of social interaction should
depend on the size of the relevant group with which one can interact. In this subsection,
I present some measures of social interaction used in the sequel.
Trust. Social interactions often rely to a large extent on face to face contacts. In small
communities, individuals interact with each other on a day to day basis and may therefore
ﬁnd it easier to trust others in their social relations. However, smaller towns might also be
more closed towards outsiders and hence distrust others more when they come from other
cities. Hence, on average, the eﬀect of city size on trust is not a priori clear.
Crime. While there are increasing returns in many social interactions, there are also
increasing returns to crime. Criminals beneﬁt from a greater number of potential targets
4and the lower costs of escape, as well as low probability of apprehension in larger cities.
The relationship between city size and crime is well documented (see, for example, Glaeser
and Sacerdote, 1999).
Matching. One of the big advantages of city life comes in the form of matching exter-
nalities. Since matching markets in cities are likely to be thick, the idea that there are
matching externalities in city size seems natural. And indeed, under certain assumptions,
one can generate matching functions with increasing returns to scale (see Duranton and
Puga, 2004). This idea has generally been applied to labour markets, but the application
to marriage markets and other social relationships is obvious.
There are two basic arguments why there would be increasing returns in matching
markets. First, individuals will ﬁnd it easier to ﬁnd a suitable partner in a bigger city.
And second, the quality of any given match is likely to be better in thicker markets.
Therefore, one would expect that the beneﬁts of interacting with friends and partners
should be higher in cities. However, things are a bit more complex. If cities are better
marriage markets, single individuals should be willing to move to cities to ﬁnd a mate.
However, individuals who have found a mate should, other things equal, be more likely to
move out of cities to beneﬁt from lower housing costs (Gautier et al., 2005). Therefore, it
is not a priori clear whether individuals in bigger cities should be more or less likely to live
with a partner.
2.3 Social capital
An important topic in a recent literature, primarily American, is the alleged fall in ‘so-
cial capital’. Glaeser (2004) discusses how cities shape individuals’ incentives to become
involved in civic matters and politics. On the one hand, urban proximity might facilitate
interaction in political community matters. On the other hand, as argued by Robert Put-
nam (2000), city residents may also be less likely to be engaged in civic matters and to be
‘socially connected’.
2.4 Satisfaction and the balance of agglomeration externalities
Suppose individuals are mobile between cities. Then, in equilibrium, an individual of given
type should be indiﬀerent between what size of city he or she should live in. There is a
5simple test of this equilibrium hypothesis. Respondents of the GSOEP are regularly asked
about their satisfaction with life and other domains such as consumption, housing, or job.
Let individual utility be a function u(c(s),h(s),w(s)) of consumption (c), housing h, and







0 = 0, (1)
where subscripts denote partial derivatives. The data will then allow separate tests of the
eﬀect of city size on satisfaction with the domains (consumption, work, housing) as well of
the equilibrium hypothesis that life satisfaction is independent of city size, du/ds = 0.
3 Data and estimation
3.1 Data
In order to test some of the hypotheses just outlined, I use survey data from the German
Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP).1 I use the waves from 1993 to 2003. However, some
variables are not available for all years (some only for 2003).
Variables and summary statistics are listed in Table 1. The dependent variables are
the following.
Consumption. The GSOEP asks individuals about their use of spare time. I use answers
to the following questions as measures of consumption:2
Now some questions about your free-time. Please indicate how often you take part in
each activity: daily, at least once a week, at least once a month, seldom or never?
• Dine out. Go out for a drink or for a meal (caf´ e, bar pub, restaurant)
• Cinema. Cinema visits, visits to pop concerts, dance events, clubs
• Concert. Visits to cultural events e.g. concerts, theatre, exhibitions
• Internet. Internet usage outside of work.
1See Haisken-DeNew and Frick (2003) for a description of the GSOEP.
2In the GSOEP, answers are coded in the order they appear on the questionnaire. Hence, daily would
be coded as 1, once a week as 2, and so on. In all these cases, I recoded variables such that if an activity
is carried out ‘more often’ or someone agrees ‘more’ with a statement, they receive a higher number.
6Social interaction. The following measures of social interaction are included in the
analysis:
• Trust. What is your opinion on the following statement? On the whole one can trust
people. (Totally agree, Agree slightly, Disagree slightly, Totally disagree)
• Friends. What would you say: How many close friends do you have?
• Visit friends. Social intercourse with friends, relatives or neighbors (daily, at least
once a week, at least once a month, seldom or never)
• Crime. What is your attitude towards the following areas - are you concerned about
them? Crime in Germany (Very concerned, Somewhat concerned, Not concerned at
all)
• Door. How often does it occur that you leave the door to your apartment unlocked?
(Very often, Often, Sometimes, Seldom, Never)
• Partner. Individual lives in a stable partnership.
Social capital. For social capital, I use the following variables:
• Member: Are you a member of one of the following organisations or unions? trade
union? professional body? works or staﬀ council at your place of work? group
or organisation that supports the conservation and protection of the environment
and/or nature? club or similar organisation?
• Participate. Participation in public initiatives, in political parties, local government
(daily, at least once a week, at least once a month, seldom or never)
• Political interest. Generally speaking, how much are you interested in politics? (Very
much, Much, Not so much, Not at all.)
Satisfaction. Individuals are asked the following questions about their satisfaction: How
satisﬁed are you today with the following areas of your life? (0 means totally unhappy, 10
means totally happy)
• Life in general
7• the supply of goods and services in your area
• your job
• your place of dwelling
• your health.
The GSOEP records the size class of the city where the individual resides in seven
classes: (1) under 2,000 inhabitants,(2) 2,000–5,000, (3) 5,000–20,000, (4) 20,000–50,000,
(5) 50,000–100,000, (6) 100,000–500,000, and (7) over 500,000 inhabitants. For the study,
I recode city size in three categories: small towns (less than 5,000 inhabitants), medium
(5,000–100,000) and large cities (more than 100,000). In order to control for other individ-
ual characteristics, I include a variety of other control variables, in particular, gender, (log
of) real household income, age, education (less than 10 years, 10 years, high school degree,
college degree), being unemployed, current health status, number of children, homeowner-
ship, living with a partner, dummy for East Germans.
3.2 Estimation
The estimation will be carried out in three steps. First, I will present results from pooled
regressions, either by OLS or (ordered) logit. Letting yit a speciﬁc dependent variable for
individual i at time t, xit a 1 × K vector of controls, sit city size and εit an i.i.d. error
term, one could estimate pooled OLS equations of the form
yit = xitα + βsit + εit, t = 1,...,T, (2)
or, in the case of a categorical variable, the ordered logit3
y
∗
it = xitα + βsit + εit (3)
yit = k ⇔ λk ≤ y
∗
it ≤ λk+1, (4)
where y∗
it is the latent variable and yit the observed categorical variable.
The maintained assumption in either (2) or (3) is that sit (as well as xit) is strictly
exogenous for εit. That means that city size varies in response to some unmeasured variable
which, however, aﬀects none of the yit.
3For binary variables, there is only one category and hence only one cut-oﬀ point in (4).
8Several issues arise in the estimation. One potential problem is individual unobserved
heterogeneity. Let ci be a dummy variable for individual i, called a ‘ﬁxed eﬀect’. Then,
estimation of (2) is biased if some of the elements of x are correlated with the ci. Consider
the eﬀect of community size on some social interaction variable, say, the number of friends.
Then, it is plausible to suppose that sociable individuals will seek environments where they
can meet each other, i.e. they will ﬂock to big cities. Hence, community size and individual
unobserved heterogeneity may be correlated, so I will also estimate ﬁxed eﬀect models of
the form
yit = xitα + βsit + ci + uit, t = 1,...,T. (5)
For estimating panel models with categorical dependent variables, the following pro-
cedure is used. For binary dependent variables, I use a standard ﬁxed eﬀects conditional






1 if yit > ¯ yi
0 else
, (6)
where ¯ yi is the individual mean. The estimated equation is then a ﬁxed eﬀect conditional
logit with y0
it as the dependent variable. This estimator is a slight variation of that devel-
oped by (see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters, 2004). Other panel models with categorical
variables have estimated ﬁxed eﬀects logit models by setting yit to 1 if it exceeds a com-
mon threshold, say, the sample mean ¯ y. The estimator in (6) has the advantage of using
individual speciﬁc cutoﬀs which implies that fewer cases are lost (see Ferrer-i-Carbonell
and Frijters, 2004, for further discussion).
Finally, while ﬁxed eﬀects estimates have the attraction of washing out individual
speciﬁc heterogeneity, they are less useful for establishing causality. Even if one has good
reason to believe that in the FE regressions in (5), xit and sit are strictly exogenous,
this may not be true, and hence, IV estimates may be necessary. In fact, individuals
should migrate to cities based on the realisation of agglomeration economies, so sit will
be correlated with the uit.4 I will, therefore, also present evidence using instrumental
variables.
4See Henderson (2003) for a discussion of the endogeneity issue in estimating productive agglomeration
externalities.
94 Pooled regression estimates
Consumption
Results on individual use of leisure time are displayed in table 2. The table shows that,
except for classical concerts, men go out more often than women. All activities seem to be
normal goods. Healthier individuals go out more, as do those who are employed. Having
a partner and having children reduces the probability of going out but increases usage of
the internet. Homeownership and education are also signiﬁcantly positively related to the
shown activities.5
The results on city size are rather clear. The ﬁrst column in the table shows that in
communities with less than 2,000 inhabitants, individuals go out to bars or restaurants less
often than in mid-sized towns. For cities of more than 100,000 inhabitants, the probability
of going out for drinks or food is signiﬁcantly higher than in mid-sized towns. The same
pattern holds for cinemas/rock concerts/dancing and classical concerts/theatres/museums.
For cinemas, however, the diﬀerence between small and mid-sized towns is not signiﬁcant.
The last column in the table shows the eﬀect of city size on internet usage. Here, too,
individuals in small towns use the internet less and individuals in large towns more often,
and both eﬀects are signiﬁcant at 5 percent. This corroborates other ﬁndings that cities
and the internet are complements rather than substitutes (see, e.g, Sinai and Waldfogel,
2004).
Glaeser (2004) also ﬁnds positive agglomeration economies for drinking out but negative
eﬀects for eating out. He also ﬁnds that individuals in central cities are more likely to go
to museums and concerts.
Social interaction
The results on social interaction are displayed in Table 3. The ﬁrst column of the table
shows the regression on trust. According to the estimates, people are signiﬁcantly more
trusting when they have higher income, better health, when they are educated, employed,
and own their dwelling. Women are somewhat more trusting but this eﬀect is not signiﬁ-
cant. Surprisingly, trust seems to be somewhat lower in small cities and no lower in large
than in medium-sized cities. Glaeser (2004), on the other hand, ﬁnds lower trust in more
5Homeownership may in reality pick up the eﬀect of wealth, which is not controlled for.
10densely populated cities.
Results for the regression of the number of close friends are displayed in the second
column of table 3. As one might expect, people have more friends (or report to have more
friends) when they have higher income, are in better health and educated. According to
the estimates, the number of friends in small communities is lower than in mid-sized cities,
but not signiﬁcantly so, while individuals in large cities report signiﬁcantly more friends.
This contrasts with Glaeser’s (2000) ﬁnding that there is a negative correlation between
city size and the number of close friends.
The third column corroborates this pattern: people interact with their friends more
when they live in large cities. This contrasts with Glaeser (2004), who ﬁnds individuals in
central cities are less likely to visit their friends.
Results on concern about crime are displayed in the fourth column of table 3. Individ-
uals are more concerned about crime the lower their income, the worse their health, the
older they are, the more children they have, and when they have a partner. Homeown-
wership seems to decrease worries about crime. These results seem somewhat peculiar,
but note that the question refers to general worries about crime, not the individual risk.
Interestingly, community size seems to be negatively correlated with worries about crime.
The ﬁfth column shows results from the regression of leaving one’s door unlocked.
Here we get the expected eﬀects: the larger the city, the less often individuals leave their
door unlocked. Thus, while concern about crime shows a negative eﬀect of agglomeration,
revealed actions do show the expected pattern. Again, since the crime question concerns
general worries about crime, it may simply be that big city residents perceive the general
crime risk as being lower while they do see themselves as city residents to be more at risk
and act accordingly. An alternative explanation would be a mild form of schizophrenia.
The idea that cities function as matching markets is examined in the last column of
Table 3. The results are interesting: in larger cities, the probability of having a partner
is signiﬁcantly lower than in smaller cities. This would not seem to be consistent with
increasing returns to scale in matching. A more sophisticated analysis of cities as marriage
markets is presented by Gautier et al. (2005). They argue (and present evidence to the
eﬀect) that individuals should come to cities to look for a partner, but when they have
found one, they should move to smaller cities where housing is cheap. Hence, what could
be at work here is the eﬀect that individuals with partners are less likely to live in cities.
11Social capital
Table 4 displays some results on ‘social capital’ (see also Glaeser, 2000). According to
results shown in the ﬁrst column, city size does not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the probability of
membership in an organisation. Glaeser (2000, 2004), on the other hand, ﬁnds individuals
in larger cities are less likely to be member of an organisation or to have attended a club
meeting. According to the second column, there is also evidence that individuals in larger
cities participate less in politics and civic matters, which seems to be evidence in favour
of Putnam’s (2000) thesis. Finally, the last column of the table shows that individuals in
cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants are signiﬁcantly more likely to be interested in
politics. This also agrees with Glaeser’s (2004) ﬁnding.
Satisfaction
Finally, let us look at the link between city size and satisfaction. The literature has used
answers to happiness questions as proxies of individual utility (Frey and Stutzer, 2002).
As outlined in section 2, if individuals are mobile between cities, urban economics pre-
dicts that agglomeration diseconomies through housing and commuting costs have to be
balanced by agglomeration economies in other areas, e.g., higher wages or social agglom-
eration economies. A test of that hypothesis can be performed by examining individual
satisfaction with life in general and certain speciﬁed domains such as work, dwelling, health,
and the supply of goods and services. Results of the test are shown in Table 5.
In general, the regressions show higher satisfaction for women, wealthier and health-
ier individuals, the young, employed, those with a partner and with children (except for
satisfaction with dwelling) and those who own their dwelling (except for satisfaction with
supply of goods/services).
The results on city size are somewhat unexpected. For all domains but supply with
goods and services, there seems to be an inversely U-shaped relationship between city size
and satisfaction. Thus, satisfaction with health, work, and dwelling seems to be largest in
mid-sized cities. The second column shows that the larger the city one lives in, the higher
the reported satisfaction with the local supply of goods and services. This is consistent with
the new economic geography, which emphasises agglomeration economies in consumption.
This new test therefore provides direct evidence in support of the NEG models using
Dixit-Stiglitz preferences.
12Finally, the ﬁrst column of Table 5 shows results for overall life satisfaction. After
controlling for individual characteristics, the table again shows a bell-shaped relation with
city size, indicating that the satisfaction maximising city has between 5,000 and 100,000
inhabitants. Glaeser (2000), on the other hand, ﬁnds that life satisfaction decreases with
(the log of) city size.
Stutzer and Frey (2004) analyse the eﬀect of commuting on happiness, and ﬁnd that
commuters enjoy signiﬁcantly lower satisfaction than non-commuters, which they interpret
as evidence that the basic tenet of location theory – equalisation of utility levels – does not
hold. The current result seems to add another piece to that puzzle. In the next section,
we will see whether that result stands up to additional testing.
5 Dealing with selection
As argued above, individuals may self select into cities based on individual character traits
such as their sociability etc. These individual character traits would thus be correlated
with city size and, hence, OLS estimates would be biased and inconsistent. Moreover, if
individuals move to cities based on agglomeration eﬀects, city size will be correlated with
the error term in regression equations of agglomeration eﬀects, and again, OLS estimates
will be biased.
Henderson (2003) performs a variety of tests in his study of productive agglomeration
economies. He concludes that instruments are generally weak and that (plant) ﬁxed eﬀects
are most likely to take care of selection issues. I will present ﬁxed eﬀects estimates in
subsection 5.2. Nonetheless, I will also try to address selection from two diﬀerent perspec-
tives: the diﬀerentiation between stayers and movers (next subsection) and instrumental
variables (subsection 5.3).
5.1 Movers versus stayers
The basic selection problem is that individuals might select into cities based on individual
characteristics which would then be correlated with agglomeration eﬀects. Hence, one
would expect that results should diﬀer according to whether individuals have moved to,
e.g., larger cities, or not.6 In the GSOEP , there are records whether individuals still live
6See, also, Charlot and Duranton (2004) and Stutzer and Frey (2004) for this approach.
13in their place of birth.7
In this subsection, I brieﬂy discuss results from separate regressions for stayers and
movers, to see whether selection indeed plays a role. For reasons of space, I will conﬁne
the discussion to the pooled regressions on the satisfaction variables.8 I also discard the
results for satisfaction with health to concentrate on the measures most directly linked to
standard urban economics.
There are some small diﬀerences in the satisfaction of movers and stayers. Satisfaction
with job and life seems to be almost identical for both groups. By contrast, movers seem
to be signiﬁcantly more satisﬁed with goods supply (mean 6.50 versus 6.29 for stayers) and
somewhat more satisﬁed with dwelling (7.50 versus 7.43).
Regression results are shown in Table 6. In general, the eﬀects of city size for stayers
and movers seem to be very similar. For satisfaction with work and dwelling, the eﬀect of
small cities is less negative for movers than for stayers. Finally, for overall life satisfaction,
the results for stayers and movers are quite opposite: stayers show signiﬁcantly lower
satisfaction in small cities and no eﬀect of large cities, while movers show higher satisfaction
in small cities and lower satisfaction in large than in mid-sized cities.
Thus, it appears that the movers experience somewhat higher satisfaction with their
dwelling and the supply of goods than stayers. However, movers also seem to realise lower
agglomeration eﬀects than stayers.
5.2 Fixed eﬀects estimates
In order to control for individual heterogeneity, in this subsection I present results from
ﬁxed eﬀects estimation.
Identiﬁcation of the eﬀect of city size is now based on those individuals for whom city
size is not constant in the time period under consideration. In the entire sample, there
7Note, however, that this information is not recorded for every person in every year, so it is possible
that a person who reported living at her place of birth when this question was asked moved later on and
this is not recorded in the survey. The possibility of discarding those years after this question was asked
is, however, problematic since it would excessively reduce sample size.
8More detailed results are available upon request. In general, the other results display less variation
between stayers and movers than the satisfaction regressions. This may indicate that the satisfaction
regressions suﬀer most from potential selection. Since it is most likely that individual migration decisions
are based on broad indicators of satisfaction and not on more speciﬁc categories of agglomeration eﬀects,
it would seem plausible that selection should play the strongest role for satisfaction.
14are about 30 percent of individuals for whom community size changes during the 11 years
considered, so there is enough variation to identify the eﬀects of city size.
For those categorical dependent variables which are coded in more than two categories,
I use ﬁxed eﬀects conditional logit estimates as described above in section 3.2.
Consumption
The results from ﬁxed eﬀects estimates for consumption variables are displayed in Table 7.
In general, the results agree reasonably well with the estimates on the pooled data. The
eﬀects of city size are also in line with those of the pooled regressions, although they are
not as strongly signiﬁcant. Big city still has a strong positive eﬀect in all three regressions.
Small city is negative in two regressions but insigniﬁcant throughout. It seems that the
big city eﬀect for consumption survives selection, while the small city eﬀect disappears. In
other words, large cities have a positive eﬀect on these activities, while the negative eﬀect
of small cities seems to be due to the composition of their residency.
Social interaction
The results from ﬁxed eﬀects regressions for the variables of social interaction are shown in
Table 8. The results are somewhat diﬀerent from the pooled regressions. In particular, city
size now shows no statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect on visiting friends. On the other hand,
worries about crime are higher in big cities when ﬁxed eﬀects are controlled for, while
without ﬁxed eﬀects there is no such eﬀect. The eﬀect of big cities on the probability of
living with a partner is, again, negative.
Social capital
Table 9 shows ﬁxed eﬀects estimates for our variables of “social capital”. These results
diﬀer markedly from the pooled regressions and some of the coeﬃcient estimates seem
“unreasonable”. For instance, income shows no signiﬁcant eﬀect on political interest while
the eﬀect of being unemployed is of “wrong” sign and that of education insigniﬁcant except
for high school diploma. The coeﬃcients for city size are interesting: individuals in small
cities are less likely to be member of an organisation, while residents of larger cities are
more likely to participate in civic matters. Political interest seems to be independent of
city size once individual heterogeneity is controlled for.
15Satisfaction
The ﬁxed eﬀects estimates for satisfaction regressions are in Table 10. Satisfaction with
work and dwelling is not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by city size anymore once individual ﬁxed
eﬀects are controlled for. Satisfaction with health, however, does fall with city size. Also,
satisfaction with the supply of goods and services increases signiﬁcantly with city size, as it
does when ﬁxed eﬀects are not controlled for. Finally, individual satisfaction with life does
not seem to depend on city sized once ﬁxed eﬀects are included. Thus, one cannot reject the
hypothesis that individual mobility leads to an urban equilibrium where individuals cannot
improve their utility by moving to a diﬀerent sized city. Diseconomies of agglomeration,
e.g. for health, do seem to be balanced by agglomeration economies in consumption.
5.3 IV estimates
One potential problem with the identiﬁcation of agglomeration externalities is the endo-
geneity of the size of cities. If large cities provide beneﬁts to residents that exceed those of
smaller cities, these externalities should induce migration responses until an equilibrium is
obtained where the beneﬁts of agglomeration are just balanced by the diseconomies in com-
muting and housing markets. Hence, in regressions of measures of agglomeration beneﬁts
on the size of the agglomeration, this size may be correlated with the error term and OLS
regressions lead to biased estimates. While ﬁxed eﬀects may be eﬃcient in dealing with
selection, they cannot be reliably used to test for causality. In this respect, instrumental
variables would be more eﬃcient. However, it is arguably diﬃcult to ﬁnd valid instruments
which are correlated with city size and not with measures of agglomeration eﬀects.
In this subsection, I report results from IV regressions, using city size in 1984 as in-
strument for current city sizes.9 Lagged city size is correlated with current city size, while
one might reasonably argue that it does not aﬀect current social interaction if the lag is
suﬃciently long.
For reasons of space, I will report only the results for the satisfaction regressions.10
These results are displayed in Table 11. Using a Wu-Hausman test, exogeneity is rejected
for all domains except dwelling. The results are, however, generally consistent with the OLS
9In order to get some more variation, I use dummies for the original size classes ranging from 2 to 7 –
size class 1 is excluded in the ﬁrst stage regressions.
10Other results are available on request.
16regressions. In particular, for health and job satisfaction, there seems to be an inverted
U-shaped correlation with city size. Satisfaction with housing is signiﬁcantly higher in
smaller cities and satisfaction with goods and services signiﬁcantly higher in larger cities.
Overall satisfaction with life, again, does not show signiﬁcant agglomeration eﬀects. Hence,
again, the equilibrium hypothesis that city size should not aﬀect individual utility cannot
be rejected.
6 Conclusion
This paper has attempted to shed some light on social interaction economies generated by
agglomeration. Individuals, it is argued, beneﬁt from being close to other consumers, not
only because they may then be more productive, but also from the beneﬁts of interacting
with others socially. These social agglomeration externalities oﬀset agglomeration disec-
onomies, e.g., in housing markets and commuting. The paper has examined agglomeration
eﬀects in consumption, social interaction, and social capital, using a variety of indicators
from survey data. These survey data are useful since ‘hard’ data on social interaction are
hard to obtain.
The results are somewhat varied, but there is clear evidence of agglomeration external-
ities in consumption. This is a signiﬁcant ﬁnding given that much of the ‘new economic
geography’ is based on this type of externalities (see Baldwin et al., 2003; Fujita et al.,
1999, for surveys).
Moreover, I have presented some illustrative evidence on agglomeration economies from
satisfaction responses. The idea was that individual mobility should lead to an equalisation
of satisfaction across diﬀerent city sizes. Agglomeration economies in some areas, say con-
sumption or social beneﬁts, or productive economies, should be balanced by diseconomies
in other areas, such as housing markets. Indeed the paper found some evidence of this
eﬀect.
The results point to the potential importance of agglomeration economies in consump-
tion and social interaction for individual location decisions. I have tried to control for the
possibility of selection of individuals into cities, but future research may shed more light
on this topic, by using diﬀerent data and looking for better instruments.
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19Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Observations
Big city 0.543 0.498 115423
Small city 0.071 0.257 115423
Life satisfaction 6.879 1.741 94327
Satisfaction with goods 6.426 2.34 93953
Satisfaction with job 6.883 2.078 57690
Satisfaction with dwelling 7.382 2.089 94098
Satisfaction with health 6.571 2.154 94328
Restaurant 2.604 0.98 24515
Cinema pop concert 2.546 1.059 66534
Concert 2.387 0.926 66534
Internet use 2.228 1.607 10493
Trust 2.604 0.717 10493
Close friends 4.219 4.105 10493
Interact with friends 3.23 0.936 24515
Concern about crime 2.48 0.6 87045
Leave door unlocked 1.826 1.238 10493
Partner 0.789 0.408 115423
member 0.091 0.288 115423
Participate 1.808 0.784 66534
Interest in politics 2.233 0.779 94352
Female 1.523 0.499 115423
Age 44.001 16.607 115423
Income per capita 11846.562 6777.197 94526
Children 0.631 0.959 94531
Unemployed 0.061 0.24 115423
Current health 3.366 0.921 87402
Owner 0.376 0.484 115423
10 years schooling 0.245 0.43 115423
High school degree 0.119 0.323 115423
College degree 0.311 0.463 115423
East 0.273 0.446 115423
20Table 2: Consumption
Dine out Cinema Concert Internet
Female -0.333 -0.246 0.279 -0.667
(0.017)∗∗ (0.012)∗∗ (0.012)∗∗ (0.028)∗∗
Partner -0.484 -0.743 -0.414 -0.043
(0.023)∗∗ (0.016)∗∗ (0.016)∗∗ (0.039)
Log (HH income) 0.600 0.449 0.470 0.576
(0.017)∗∗ (0.012)∗∗ (0.012)∗∗ (0.027)∗∗
Current health 0.214 0.181 0.252 0.100
(0.010)∗∗ (0.007)∗∗ (0.007)∗∗ (0.016)∗∗
Age -0.027 -0.116 0.044 0.015
(0.003)∗∗ (0.002)∗∗ (0.002)∗∗ (0.006)∗
Age squared -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗
Unemployed -0.391 -0.262 -0.392 -0.101
(0.034)∗∗ (0.022)∗∗ (0.023)∗∗ (0.056)†
Children -0.398 -0.344 -0.272 -0.116
(0.010)∗∗ (0.007)∗∗ (0.007)∗∗ (0.015)∗∗
Owner 0.048 0.146 0.324 0.174
(0.019)∗ (0.013)∗∗ (0.013)∗∗ (0.032)∗∗
10 years schooling 0.293 0.461 0.648 0.595
(0.021)∗∗ (0.014)∗∗ (0.014)∗∗ (0.034)∗∗
High school degree 0.531 0.671 1.317 1.205
(0.037)∗∗ (0.025)∗∗ (0.027)∗∗ (0.053)∗∗
College degree 0.514 0.679 1.550 1.154
(0.028)∗∗ (0.019)∗∗ (0.020)∗∗ (0.040)∗∗
Small city -0.229 -0.015 -0.243 -0.187
(0.033)∗∗ (0.023) (0.023)∗∗ (0.051)∗∗
Big city 0.175 0.155 0.196 0.177
(0.018)∗∗ (0.012)∗∗ (0.012)∗∗ (0.030)∗∗
East -0.626 0.105 -0.106 -0.144
(0.022)∗∗ (0.014)∗∗ (0.015)∗∗ (0.040)∗∗
Observations 46983 116380 116380 22560
Log likelihood -59376.74 -121526.75 -112888.29 -25844.23
Year dummies included. Standard errors in parentheses.
† signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
21Table 3: Social interaction
Trust Friends Visit friends Crime Door Partner
Female 0.069 -0.122 0.114 0.214 -0.009 -0.181
(0.026)∗∗ (0.056)∗ (0.017)∗∗ (0.010)∗∗ (0.026) (0.012)∗∗
Partner -0.052 -0.036 -0.426 0.236 0.001
(0.035) (0.075) (0.024)∗∗ (0.012)∗∗ (0.036)
Log (HH income) 0.164 0.311 0.041 -0.106 0.040 1.197
(0.024)∗∗ (0.051)∗∗ (0.017)∗ (0.010)∗∗ (0.025) (0.013)∗∗
Current health 0.391 0.397 0.152 -0.120 -0.033 -0.066
(0.016)∗∗ (0.032)∗∗ (0.010)∗∗ (0.006)∗∗ (0.015)∗ (0.007)∗∗
Age -0.008 -0.032 -0.111 0.015 0.004 0.056
(0.005) (0.010)∗∗ (0.003)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗ (0.005) (0.002)∗∗
Age squared 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗
Unemployed -0.302 -0.182 0.104 0.020 -0.108 0.381
(0.053)∗∗ (0.113) (0.034)∗∗ (0.020) (0.054)∗ (0.024)∗∗
Children -0.007 -0.108 -0.036 -0.026 0.129 0.711
(0.016) (0.033)∗∗ (0.010)∗∗ (0.006)∗∗ (0.015)∗∗ (0.009)∗∗
Owner 0.112 0.219 -0.017 -0.032 0.277 -0.178
(0.029)∗∗ (0.062)∗∗ (0.019) (0.011)∗∗ (0.030)∗∗ (0.014)∗∗
10 years schooling 0.044 0.147 -0.155 0.017 0.048 0.259
(0.032) (0.069)∗ (0.021)∗∗ (0.012) (0.033) (0.015)∗∗
High school degree 0.393 0.248 -0.041 -0.422 0.163 -0.377
(0.055)∗∗ (0.117)∗ (0.038) (0.022)∗∗ (0.054)∗∗ (0.025)∗∗
College degree 0.409 0.439 -0.013 -0.600 0.346 0.325
(0.040)∗∗ (0.085)∗∗ (0.028) (0.016)∗∗ (0.039)∗∗ (0.022)∗∗
Small city -0.112 0.005 -0.071 0.057 0.240 0.116
(0.048)∗ (0.102) (0.033)∗ (0.020)∗∗ (0.046)∗∗ (0.024)∗∗
Big city 0.032 0.269 0.094 -0.039 -0.179 -0.198
(0.029) (0.061)∗∗ (0.019)∗∗ (0.011)∗∗ (0.029)∗∗ (0.013)∗∗
East -0.334 -0.305 -0.550 0.576 -0.046 0.128
(0.037)∗∗ (0.081)∗∗ (0.023)∗∗ (0.013)∗∗ (0.038) (0.016)∗∗
Constant 0.553 -13.136
(0.576) (0.140)∗∗
Observations 22560 22560 46983 163720 22560 164753
Log likelihood -22904.48 -58721.04 -138653.73 -27463.93 -81906.75
R-squared 0.02
Year dummies included. Standard errors in parentheses.
† signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
22Table 4: Social capital
Member Participate Interest in politics
Female -0.764 -0.326 -0.848
(0.020)∗∗ (0.017)∗∗ (0.010)∗∗
Partner -0.068 -0.113 -0.016
(0.027)∗ (0.023)∗∗ (0.012)
Log (HH income) 0.361 0.169 0.255
(0.020)∗∗ (0.017)∗∗ (0.009)∗∗
Current health 0.006 0.073 0.091
(0.011) (0.010)∗∗ (0.006)∗∗
Age 0.108 0.054 0.029
(0.004)∗∗ (0.003)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗
Age squared -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗
Unemployed -0.570 -0.104 -0.160
(0.043)∗∗ (0.035)∗∗ (0.019)∗∗
Children -0.072 -0.006 -0.078
(0.012)∗∗ (0.010) (0.005)∗∗
Owner 0.195 0.369 0.169
(0.021)∗∗ (0.019)∗∗ (0.011)∗∗
10 years schooling 0.281 0.171 0.659
(0.024)∗∗ (0.022)∗∗ (0.012)∗∗
High school degree 0.294 0.412 1.294
(0.042)∗∗ (0.038)∗∗ (0.021)∗∗
College degree 0.507 0.641 1.407
(0.029)∗∗ (0.026)∗∗ (0.016)∗∗
Small city -0.020 0.272 -0.038
(0.036) (0.031)∗∗ (0.018)∗
Big city -0.012 -0.031 0.154
(0.021) (0.019)† (0.010)∗∗




Observations 58403 116380 164419
Log likelihood -32152.35 -58861.17 -178715.03
Year dummies included. Standard errors in parentheses.
† signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
23Table 5: Satisfaction
Life Goods Work Dwelling Health
Female 0.151 0.034 0.048 0.161 0.045
(0.009)∗∗ (0.009)∗∗ (0.011)∗∗ (0.009)∗∗ (0.009)∗∗
Log (HH income) 0.293 0.042 0.262 0.146 0.045
(0.009)∗∗ (0.008)∗∗ (0.012)∗∗ (0.009)∗∗ (0.009)∗∗
Current health 0.967 0.292 0.694 0.368 2.296
(0.006)∗∗ (0.005)∗∗ (0.007)∗∗ (0.005)∗∗ (0.007)∗∗
Age 0.013 0.016 0.002 0.018 -0.007
(0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗ (0.001)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗
Age squared -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗ (0.000)† (0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗
Unemployed -0.928 -0.117 -2.100 -0.221 -0.124
(0.018)∗∗ (0.017)∗∗ (0.042)∗∗ (0.017)∗∗ (0.018)∗∗
Children -0.070 -0.028 -0.005 -0.116 0.019
(0.005)∗∗ (0.005)∗∗ (0.006) (0.005)∗∗ (0.005)∗∗
Partner 0.138 -0.053 -0.051 0.069 -0.093
(0.011)∗∗ (0.011)∗∗ (0.015)∗∗ (0.011)∗∗ (0.011)∗∗
Owner 0.223 -0.227 0.051 0.932 0.073
(0.010)∗∗ (0.010)∗∗ (0.013)∗∗ (0.010)∗∗ (0.010)∗∗
10 years schooling -0.041 -0.038 0.038 -0.010 -0.014
(0.011)∗∗ (0.011)∗∗ (0.014)∗∗ (0.011) (0.011)
High school degree 0.049 0.104 -0.040 -0.083 -0.059
(0.019)∗ (0.019)∗∗ (0.024) (0.019)∗∗ (0.020)∗∗
College degree 0.015 0.073 0.049 -0.038 -0.011
(0.014) (0.014)∗∗ (0.017)∗∗ (0.014)∗∗ (0.014)
Small city -0.114 -0.724 -0.059 -0.059 -0.101
(0.017)∗∗ (0.017)∗∗ (0.022)∗∗ (0.017)∗∗ (0.017)∗∗
Big city -0.035 0.187 -0.067 -0.138 -0.067
(0.010)∗∗ (0.009)∗∗ (0.012)∗∗ (0.009)∗∗ (0.010)∗∗
East -0.616 -0.409 -0.229 -0.279 -0.334
(0.012)∗∗ (0.011)∗∗ (0.015)∗∗ (0.012)∗∗ (0.012)∗∗
Observations 164406 163170 98476 163605 164368
Log likelihood -289343.74 -350610.26 -194050.30 -309838.54 -272806.70
Year dummies included. Standard errors in parentheses.
† signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
24Table 6: Satisfaction (Movers vs stayers)
Small city Big city Observations Log likelihood
Coeﬀ. Std. error Coeﬀ. Std. error
Life (Stayers) -0.104 (0.023)∗∗ 0.013 (0.014) 74828 -130812.18
Life (Movers) -0.079 (0.031)∗ -0.052 (0.017)∗∗ 53671 -94323.55
Goods (Stayers) -0.652 (0.023)∗∗ 0.243 (0.014)∗∗ 74080 -160603.59
Goods (Movers) -0.767 (0.032)∗∗ 0.187 (0.016)∗∗ 53372 -114106.16
Work (Stayers) -0.099 (0.029)∗∗ -0.035 (0.018)† 45615 -89618.18
Work (Movers) 0.021 (0.042) -0.057 (0.022)∗∗ 29717 -58581.14
Dwelling (Stayers) -0.099 (0.023)∗∗ -0.083 (0.014)∗∗ 74271 -139287.20
Dwelling (Movers) 0.034 (0.031) -0.152 (0.017)∗∗ 53559 -98855.33
Health (Stayers) -0.081 (0.023)∗∗ -0.057 (0.014)∗∗ 74790 -123271.98
Health (Movers) -0.110 (0.031)∗∗ -0.034 (0.017)∗ 53670 -89426.99
Year dummies included. Standard errors in parentheses.
† signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
25Table 7: Consumption (FE logit)
Dine out Cinema Concert
Partner -0.523 -1.191 -0.730
(0.059)∗∗ (0.047)∗∗ (0.051)∗∗
Log (HH income) 0.278 0.218 0.208
(0.040)∗∗ (0.029)∗∗ (0.032)∗∗
Current health 0.144 0.082 0.099
(0.022)∗∗ (0.016)∗∗ (0.017)∗∗
Age squared 0.000 -0.003 -0.005
(0.000) (0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗
Unemployed -0.263 0.010 -0.046
(0.060)∗∗ (0.042) (0.046)
Children -0.338 -0.264 -0.152
(0.027)∗∗ (0.021)∗∗ (0.024)∗∗
Owner -0.086 -0.173 -0.252
(0.057) (0.044)∗∗ (0.049)∗∗
10 years schooling 0.093 -0.104 -0.239
(0.069) (0.058)† (0.065)∗∗
High school degree 0.451 -0.170 -0.228
(0.106)∗∗ (0.085)∗ (0.096)∗
College degree 0.222 -0.353 -0.494
(0.101)∗ (0.087)∗∗ (0.097)∗∗
Small city 0.077 -0.077 -0.032
(0.093) (0.068) (0.075)
Big city 0.130 0.255 0.335
(0.051)∗ (0.038)∗∗ (0.042)∗∗
Observations 22259 108256 108421
Log likelihood -7844.88 -23983.43 -20239.55
Year dummies included. Standard errors in parentheses.
† signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
26Table 8: Social interaction (FE logit)
Visit friends Crime Partner
Partner -0.419 0.136
(0.069)∗∗ (0.040)∗∗
Log (HH income) 0.022 -0.003 -0.503
(0.057) (0.033) (0.054)∗∗
Current health 0.066 -0.054 0.010
(0.028)∗ (0.015)∗∗ (0.028)
Age squared 0.000 -0.000 -0.008
(0.000) (0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗
Unemployed 0.132 0.028 -0.021
(0.074)† (0.041) (0.076)
Children -0.072 0.027 0.380
(0.037)† (0.022) (0.037)∗∗
Owner 0.101 0.039 0.300
(0.074) (0.042) (0.071)∗∗
10 years schooling -0.040 0.027 0.503
(0.082) (0.048) (0.075)∗∗
High school degree 0.108 -0.003 -0.427
(0.153) (0.078) (0.132)∗∗
College degree -0.144 -0.071 1.127
(0.127) (0.072) (0.130)∗∗
Small city 0.009 0.056 -0.013
(0.103) (0.065) (0.118)
Big city -0.084 0.064 -0.197
(0.062) (0.036)† (0.061)∗∗
Observations 15011 70316 20604
Log likelihood -5414.82 -28720.76 -7194.75
Year dummies included. Standard errors in parentheses.
† signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
27Table 9: Social capital (FE logit)
Member Participate Interest in politics
Log (HH income) 0.109 0.096 -0.020
(0.054)∗ (0.037)∗∗ (0.021)
Current health 0.010 0.000 0.071
(0.025) (0.019) (0.011)∗∗
Age squared 0.001 -0.007 -0.001
(0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗
Unemployed -0.141 0.041 0.054
(0.080)† (0.053) (0.032)†
Children -0.155 -0.026 -0.020
(0.039)∗∗ (0.027) (0.017)
Partner 0.103 -0.534 0.173
(0.080) (0.058)∗∗ (0.036)∗∗
Owner 0.042 -0.222 -0.077
(0.074) (0.056)∗∗ (0.034)∗
10 years schooling 0.185 -0.304 0.052
(0.097)† (0.075)∗∗ (0.041)
High school degree 0.013 -0.558 0.219
(0.154) (0.109)∗∗ (0.062)∗∗
College degree -0.021 -0.762 0.015
(0.136) (0.110)∗∗ (0.061)
Small city -0.378 0.076 0.058
(0.122)∗∗ (0.087) (0.055)
Big city -0.030 0.425 0.025
(0.065) (0.051)∗∗ (0.030)
Observations 73705 109397 117251
Log likelihood -10013.52 -15265.57 -45886.61
Year dummies included. Standard errors in parentheses.
† signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
28Table 10: Satisfaction (FE)
Life Goods Work Dwelling Health
Life Goods Work Health Dwelling
Partner 0.322 -0.106 -0.145 -0.062 0.233
(0.029)∗∗ (0.029)∗∗ (0.036)∗∗ (0.032)† (0.029)∗∗
Log (HH income) 0.141 0.030 0.104 0.028 -0.008
(0.018)∗∗ (0.017)† (0.026)∗∗ (0.019) (0.017)
Current health 0.653 0.145 0.445 1.673 0.188
(0.010)∗∗ (0.009)∗∗ (0.012)∗∗ (0.013)∗∗ (0.009)∗∗
Age squared -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗
Unemployed -0.740 -0.127 -1.397 -0.084 0.031
(0.027)∗∗ (0.026)∗∗ (0.059)∗∗ (0.029)∗∗ (0.026)
Children -0.003 -0.017 0.034 -0.016 -0.074
(0.014) (0.013) (0.017)∗ (0.015) (0.014)∗∗
Owner 0.122 -0.183 -0.011 -0.025 1.240
(0.028)∗∗ (0.027)∗∗ (0.034) (0.030) (0.029)∗∗
10 years schooling -0.083 -0.050 0.089 -0.015 -0.039
(0.034)∗ (0.033) (0.047)† (0.037) (0.034)
High school degree -0.136 -0.007 0.028 -0.100 -0.228
(0.052)∗∗ (0.050) (0.081) (0.056)† (0.052)∗∗
College degree 0.008 -0.018 0.138 -0.089 -0.059
(0.050) (0.049) (0.065)∗ (0.054) (0.050)
Small city 0.041 -0.189 0.068 0.020 0.077
(0.045) (0.043)∗∗ (0.057) (0.048) (0.045)†
Big city -0.012 0.074 0.007 0.009 -0.173
(0.024) (0.023)∗∗ (0.030) (0.026) (0.024)∗∗
Observations 153050 156794 89420 154372 151062
Log likelihood -65985.18 -70239.85 -38863.67 -58065.09 -66504.25
Year dummies included. Standard errors in parentheses.
† signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
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Life Goods Work Dwelling Health
Life Goods Work Dwelling
Small city 0.003 -1.242 0.052 0.213
(0.057) (0.081)∗∗ (0.108) (0.068)∗∗
Big city -0.001 0.226 -0.223 -0.153
(0.025) (0.035)∗∗ (0.047)∗∗ (0.030)∗∗
Geschlecht 0.140 0.083 0.114 0.206
(0.018)∗∗ (0.025)∗∗ (0.032)∗∗ (0.021)∗∗
Log real household income 0.194 0.140 0.279 0.096
(0.018)∗∗ (0.025)∗∗ (0.037)∗∗ (0.021)∗∗
Current health 0.913 0.426 0.781 0.427
(0.010)∗∗ (0.014)∗∗ (0.019)∗∗ (0.012)∗∗
Age -0.021 -0.011 0.029 -0.014
(0.003)∗∗ (0.005)∗ (0.008)∗∗ (0.004)∗∗
Age squared 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000
(0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗ (0.000)∗∗
Unemployed -0.650 0.028 -2.007 -0.169
(0.044)∗∗ (0.062) (0.131)∗∗ (0.052)∗∗
Children -0.073 -0.052 -0.045 -0.160
(0.012)∗∗ (0.016)∗∗ (0.018)∗ (0.014)∗∗
Partner 0.291 0.113 0.038 0.245
(0.024)∗∗ (0.034)∗∗ (0.045) (0.029)∗∗
Owner 0.172 -0.016 0.036 0.863
(0.020)∗∗ (0.028) (0.036) (0.024)∗∗
10 years schooling 0.034 0.022 0.033 0.063
(0.023) (0.033) (0.039) (0.027)∗
High school degree -0.039 0.073 -0.069 -0.164
(0.043) (0.061) (0.075) (0.051)∗∗
College degree 0.004 -0.002 0.092 -0.004
(0.032) (0.045) (0.050)† (0.038)
East 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 1.526 2.455 0.653 4.136
(0.211)∗∗ (0.295)∗∗ (0.426) (0.248)∗∗
Observations 29831 29601 15030 29722
Year dummies included. Standard errors in parentheses.
† signiﬁcant at 10%; ∗ signiﬁcant at 5%; ∗∗ signiﬁcant at 1%.
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